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I) INTRODUCTION 
The Parkers have had the opportunity to both read and contemplate the arguments 
presented by the Tax Commission in its Brief filed 8 April 2009. The Parkers will address the 
arguments presented in the order presented. 
11) REBUTTAL ANALYSIS 
At Page 2 of its Brief, the Tax Commission indicates that it requested Summary 
Judgment it its favor. However, when looking at the Record, the Parkers were the only party to 
actually file a Motion for Summary Judgment. @. Vol. I, Pg 23-24). This technical difference 
may be important if and when this Court resolves any factual disputes; most importantly, because 
the Tax Commission did not move for Summary Judgment, the parties cannot be deemed to have 
agreed that there are no genuine issues of material fact which is generally the case when both 
parties move for Summary Judgment. See for example McFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921,923, 
88 P.3d 740 (2004)(If parties rely on same facts, issues and theories, the parties effectively 
stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact; however, the mere fact that both parties 
move for Summary Judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact.). Even though the Parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts, some contested issues 
remained. For example, the Stipulated Facts specifically reserved the right, as subsequently 
raised by the Tax Commission, to further develop contested, determinative facts such as whether 
or not Mr. Parker had sufficient contacts with Idaho to meet Constitutional standards. 
At Page 4 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that the Court Record contained 
conflicting inferences and that the District Court resolved said inferences in the Tax 
Commission's favor. With all due respect, the Parkers believe that the District Court's Order 
does not identify any inferences that it made or in whose favor it made those inferences. This is 
important for two reasons: (1) the Party against whom the inference was made would have the 
right to challenge the basis upon which the inference was made and whether or not it was 
reasonable; and, more importantly, (2) the Constitutional issues presented should be resolved on 
established fact, not undefined inferences. 
For example, at Page 5 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that the District Court 
weighed Mr. Parker's statements against the other evidence in the record, found that there were 
conflicting inferences in the record and then determined that: Mr. Parker had an interest in 
income producing property located in Idaho and that half of the marital community was 
domiciled in Idaho. The Tax Commission then argues that the District Court then concluded that 
Mr. Parker had sufficient contacts with the state of Idaho to subject him to income tax in the 
state. 
There are several problems with the Tax Commission's argument regarding these 
purported inferences. First, as discussed above, only the Parkers actually filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Consequently, the analysis on Appeal should proceed on that basis1. 
Secondly, the District Court's Order does not state that it identified conflicting inferences, 
weighed Mr. Parker's statements against other evidence in the record or resolved any conflicting 
inferences either for or against any party. There is absolutely no stated factual basis whatsoever 
'Even if it could be argued that the Tax Commission argued for Summary Judgment 
through its Rebuttal Brief, the Parties did not rely on the same facts, issues or theories. Therefore 
the Parties did not effectively stipulate that there was no genuine issue of material fact. To the 
contrary, the Tax Commission maintains in its briefing that Mr. Parker received Idaho-sourced 
income. And, specifically asked the District Court to allow further factual development on this 
very issue. 
for the conclusory statement that Mr. Parker had an interest in income producing property located 
in Idaho. The District Court's Order does not identify either the property or how Mr. Parker had 
such an interest. 
After presenting its argument regarding inferences, the Tax Commission presents the 
District Court's conclusion, that Mr. Parker had "sufficient minimun~ contacts" with the state of 
Idaho to subject him to Idaho income tax, as the result of the District Court's weighing the 
evidence and resolving conflicting inferences. In addition to the argument presented above, 
neither the District Court's analysis nor the Tax Commission's argument addresses the 
ramifications of the Parties' stipulation that Mr. Parker was a Nevada domiciliary. At the risk of 
being too repetitive, please remember that the District Court denied the Tax Commission's 
Motion to Strike portions of Mr. Parker's Affidavit resulting in the admissibility of his 
statements that he had not received any benefit &om Mrs. Parker's income, that there was no 
sharing of assets and his opinion that he did not have an obligation to file an Idaho income tax 
return based upon his personal knowledge. 0. Vol. I, Page 40). This admitted evidence directly 
addressed the filing issue because Mr. Parker testified that he had not received any Idaho-sourced 
income, in any form, including wages, dividends or property sale proceeds. @. Vol. I, Page 25). 
Therefore, the District Court erred in failing to identify the basis for its statement regarding 
"sufficient minimum contacts" and in making such a statement without any supporting facts in 
the first instance; alternatively, the District Court could have granted the Tax Commission's 
request for further factual development on this issue. 
Now, should the Tax Commission argue that such "sufficient minimum contacts" arise 
simply by operation of community law principles, then this underscores the problem with taxing 
Mr. Parker's income in the first instance: application of a legal principle suddenly subjects non- 
residents to Idaho income tax on non-Idaho sourced income without any underlying factual 
minimum contacts, i.e. form over substance. Furthermore, without the appropriate factual 
foundation, general application the District Court's conclusion of "sufficient minimum contacts 
with the state of Idaho to subject him [Mr. Parker] to income tax in the state" at face value 
quickly opens the door to prohibitive over-reaching. The reasoning being that if such "sufficient 
minimum contacts" exist, then a taxpayer's entire income could be subject to Idaho tax because 
once established, there are, absent legislative action, no limits to the state imposing its tax. 
Therefore, as written, the Order implies that the only basis for the District Court's finding that 
Mr. Parker had "sufficient minimum contacts" with Idaho is the application of community 
property principles which the Parkers have addressed in their Opening Brief. 
At Page 6 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that once it issues a Deficiency 
Determination, it is presumed to be correct and correspondingly the Parkers have the burden of 
proving it is erroneous. W i l e  this may be correct at the administrative level where the Tax 
Commission issues a written decision, it does not control at the District Court level. Idaho Code 
$63-3049(a) provides that, upon service of the Tax Commission, "the case shall proceed as other 
civil cases." Consequently, this Court will review the District Court's Order as an ordinary civil 
action, and will utilize the Tax Commission's administrative determination as merely an 
articulation of its position in this action. Pratt v. State Tax Comm'n, 128 Idaho 883, 884, 920 
P.2d 400 (1996). Therefore, as the Parkers read the case law, the Tax Commission's Amended 
Decision is not entitled to any presumption of correctness and this Court's normal standards of 
review apply. 
At Page 8 of its Brief, the Tax Commission presents two interesting arguments. First, it 
discusses the formation of the marital community and that, once created, it can only end when 
one spouse passes away or a divorce occurs. Then second argument is that LC. $32-906 provides 
that income earned during marriage, regardless of source, is community property. We will now 
address each argument in turn. 
The concept of a "marital community," as a separate entity, is a concept that, as far as 
Parkers' Counsel can ascertain, has lost viability with the passage of time; the current law 
focuses on the domicile of each spouse. However, if the Tax Commission continues to push the 
idea, then, with all due respect, the Parkers' analysis in its Opening Brief discussing application 
of Asarco and progeny to the marital community is relevant because the unitary business concept 
specifically looks at a business as a separate entity composed of several, distinct components. 
The Parkers invite the Tax Commission to discuss this concept and its viability at oral argument. 
Regarding LC. $32-906, neither the District Court nor the Tax Commission have 
articulated a rationale for applying Idaho community property law to a Nevada domiciliary when 
said domiciliary lacks "sufficient minimum contacts" with Idaho separate and apart from the bare 
application of LC. 532-906. Assuming for purposes of this argument that Mr. Parker had Idaho- 
sourced income, his Idaho filing status would have been a non-resident reporting the Idaho- 
sourced income alone. Absent treating the "marital community" as a separate entity or without 
"sufficient minimum contacts" there is simply no basis for applying Idaho community property 
law to Mr. Parker. And, interestingly enough, the Tax Commission's position taken in its Brief 
regarding this issue appears contradictory with the position articulated in the Amended Decision; 
to wit: after quoting Nevada Revised Statute $123.220, the Tax Commission wrote "[tlherefore, 
the Commission concludes that the community property laws should govern the ownership of the 
income in question." @. Vol. I, Page 22R). In other words, in its Amended Decision, the Tax 
Commission appears to state that the community law of each spouse's domicile should be 
applied but in its Brief on Appeal, in defending the District Court's Order, it argues that Idaho 
community property law should be applied to both spouses regardless of domicile. 
At Pages 9 and 10 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that because Mrs. Parker was 
an Idaho resident, requiring her to report and pay tax on her income derived from any source, 
including one-half of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages, comports with Due Process. In support of this 
argument, the Tax Commission places great weight on this Court's holding and analysis in 
Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335,393 P.2d 35 (1964). The Tax Commission then argues that the 
Parkers have not set forth any rationale for applying Nevada community property law, other than 
the Oregon case which the Tax Commission asks this Court not to follow because the District 
Court found that half of the marital community was domiciled in Idaho.2 
Herndon involved an Idaho resident who was also a partner in an Oklahoma partnership. 
The issue presented asked whether or not the taxpayer should report the income she received 
through the Oklahoma partnership on her Idaho resident income tax return. The Tax Commission 
correctly identifies this Court's holding that, as an Idaho resident, the taxpayer had to report her 
income from all sources. The Herndon analysis does not apply to the issues in this case because 
2At this point, it appears that the Tax Commission and the District Court implicitly 
acknowledge that the concept of "marital community,'! as a separate and distinct entity apart from 
the two spouses, does not exist. To argue that one-half of the marital community is in Idaho is to 
argue that one of the spouses is domiciled in Idaho. The other one-half of the marital community 
is located in Nevada, Mr. Parker's domicile. Therefore, as the Oregon appellate court recognized, 
the domicile of each spouse does cany significance and should be recognized in any analysis. 
Mr. Parker is not an Idaho domiciliary and it did not involve combination of principles of 
community law and residency. And finally, the Herndon opinion was rendered well before the 
seminal Commerce Clause case, Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
Therefore, again with all due respect, the Herndon opinion does not resolve the issues involved 
in this case. 
Turning to the Tax Commission's one sentence asking this Court not to follow the 
Oregon case discussed by the Parkers in their Opening Brief, the Tax Commission is correct in 
that the Parkers have argued that this Court should not follow its analysis. However, the Parkers 
do go on to argue that if this Court chooses to adopt that appellate court's reasoning regarding 
application of Nevada community property law, then this Court should reverse the District 
Court's Order and remand the case for further factual development on the issue of whether or 
not, under Nevada law, Mr. Parker's earnings should be considered his sole and separate 
property. 
As the Tax Commission will recall, this is exactly what it did in its Amended Decision 
when it wrote that there was no writing between the Parties treating each party's income as their 
own sole and separate property, per Nevada Revised Statute $123.220. Because the District Court 
hears the Parkers' appeal de novo, and Mr. Parker's statements that he did not receive or rely on 
Mrs. Parkers' income remains admissible and uncontroverted evidence, should this Court adopt 
the analysis of Keller v. Department of Revenue, 642 P.284 (Ore. 1982), then this matter should 
be remanded to the District Court for evidentiary development of whether or not the Parties have 
de facto treated each Party's income as their respective sole and separate property. 
Also at Page 1 1 of its Brief, the Tax Commission quotes the District Court's finding that: 
"[wlhere one of the spouses is a domiciliary of the taxing state, there is substantial nexus 
between the state and the marriage and the income tax is fairly related to the services provided to 
the resident spouse." See Page 44 of R. Vol. I. Again it appears that the District Court and the 
Tax Commission consider the "marital community" to be an entity separate and apart from the 
two spouses. 
The Parkers submit that there are several problems with this finding. First, the concept of 
a "marital community" being a separate entity apart from the husband and wife is, and has been 
falling out of favor with the various state courts. And, the Parkers could find no recent reported 
Idaho decision acknowledging that either Idaho common law or statutory law recognizes a 
"marital community" as an entity separate and distinct from the two spouses. Second, if we apply 
the same logic to Mr. Parker, then one-half of the marital community would also be domiciled in 
Nevada because he is a Nevada domiciliary which would require, under the District Court's 
analysis as propounded by the Tax Commission, consideration of Nevada community property 
law. And finally, if the marital community does exists as a separate entity, then the Parkers' 
rationale for applying the Asarco unitary business analysis, discussed in their Opening Brief, has 
merit because, as with other unitary businesses transacting business in more than one jurisdiction, 
there must be a fair apportionment. 
And finally, at Page 11 of its Brief, the Tax Commission writes that: "ljlust as Kathy 
Parker is entitled to one-half of the community income earned in Nevada, David Parker is 
entitled to one-half of the community income earned in Idaho." In writing this, the Tax 
Commission appears to concede the Parkers' argument that each Party should be allocated one- 
half of each Party's wages. 
At Page 12 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that the United States Supreme 
Court, in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), held that each spouse in a marriage has a 
vested right in one-half of any property or income the couple acquires while domiciled in a 
community property state. Relying on this vested right concept, the Tax Commission presents 
that Mrs. Parker has a vested right to one-half of Mr. Parker's wages. However, each time the 
Tax Commission makes this argument, it fails to discuss the corresponding result that, applying 
the same vested rights analysis, Mr. Parker has a vested right to one-half of Mrs. Parker's wages. 
And, if consistently applied, the result is as argued for in the Parkers' Opening Brief: only one- 
half of each spouse's wages should be subject to Idaho income tax. 
At Page 14 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that the Parkers have failed to 
establish the applicability of the Commerce Clause. The Parkers respond that the Tax 
Commission never raised this issue before the District Court nor did they appeal the District 
Court's analysis of the Parkers' Commerce Clause challenges and, therefore, should not be 
permitted to raise it for the first time on Appeal. See for example, State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 
195, 824 P.2d 123 (1992)(Generally, issues not raised below cannot be considered for first time 
on appeal.). If however, this Court determines to hear the issue, then the Parkers respectfully 
submit that since Mr. and Mrs. Parker are domiciliaries of separate states, the Commerce Clause 
is indeed implicated. See Idaho State Tax Commission v. Stang, 135 Idaho 800,25 P.3d 113 
(2001)(Commerce Clause analysis applied to disallowance of resident taxpayers' deductions for 
distributions from their IRAs.). 
At Page 15 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that because Nevada does not have a 
state income tax, there is no real controversy and, therefore, this claim is non-justiciable. The 
District Court's analysis and the Tax Commission's argument misses the point: the Commerce 
Clause analysis specifically considers what would happen if all the States applied the same 
challenged taxing formula, and not whether the other States have actually applied it. The United 
States Supreme Court's Commerce Clause analysis looks not to what the States have actually 
done; it looks to the result that would obtain if all the States applied the taxing formula then 
being challenged. At the risk of over-simplification, the Commerce Clause analysis is quite 
simple: If both Nevada and Idaho applied the Tax Commission's formula for calculating the 
Parkers' taxable Idaho income, then 150% of the combined community income would be taxed 
rather than 100%. 
At Page 18 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that 'IRC $6015 cannot be used to 
preempt state community property laws to change the determination of Idaho taxable income." 
As authority for this statement, the Tax Commission cites Ordlock v. C.LR., 533 F.3d 1136 (9'h 
Cir. 2008). However the Parkers submit that the Ordlock case does not apply to their case 
presently before the Court. 
In Ordlock both husband and wife were California residents. The Ninth Circuit looked to 
California community property law which permitted creditors of one spouse to seek payment 
from community property. Ordlock, 533 F.3d, at Page 1138-1 139. The Ninth Circuit did hold 
that Congress did not intend $6015 to pre-empt California community property law and, 
consequently, the court applied California's community property law and permitted the creditor 
to seek satisfaction from the parties' community property. In reaching this result, the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the denial of the non-creditor spouse's claim for refbnd even though she had 
qualified for income tax relief under IRC $6015. 
The Parkers do not seek preemption of Idaho community property law. Instead, for the 
reasons stated in this regard in their Opening Brief, they ask this Court to apply the principles of 
IRC $6015 and grant the marital community, should this Court determine that it exists as an 
entity separate and apart from the two spouses, relief from the Idaho income tax resulting from 
inclusion of one-half of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages. Such recognition could occur on a limited 
basis resulting from the filing concept of "married filing jointly." The Parkers respectfully submit 
that even if such a filing concept does create a "marital community" for income tax purposes, this 
still does not permit a constitutionally infirm method of calculating Idaho income tax. 
Assuming for purposes of this argument that a "marital community" exists as a separate 
entity, adoption of IRC $6015 would not conflict with Idaho law because it does not redefie 
"income" or provide for a deduction or credit. Rather the resulting in preemption, its application 
simply augments Idaho income tax law by providing relief from Idaho income tax that results 
from application of Idaho community property law. 
At Page 18 of its Brief, the Tax Commission then argues that corporate income tax 
principles are inapplicable to the Parkers because the statutory method for taxing individuals is 
different from the statutory method for taxing corporations. As a general statement, the Parkers 
would agree. However, the Parkers disagree with such a broad proposition in this case because 
the Tax Commission, and the District Court, have identified the concept of "marital community" 
as an entity separate and apart from the two spouses, and proceeded with respective analysis 
based upon that proposition. Should this Court accepts such a proposition, then the corporate 
income tax principles regarding apportionment do indeed apply to this separate entity. However, 
if this Court determines, along with the various other states, that "marital community," as a 
separate entity, does not cxist and that the focus should be on the domicile of the spouses, then 
corporate income tax principles probably should not apply.3 
At Page 20 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that it filed Mr. Gunter's Affidavit to 
both protect its position and to rebut Mr. Parker's assertions that he (Mr. Parker) did not receive 
any Idaho-sourced income. More specifically, the Tax Commission asserts that Mr. Parker 
"owned" one-half of the Idaho income earned by Mrs. Parker and would be required to report 
that income. The Parkers have addressed what they perceive to be problems regarding the 
admissibility of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit, Paragraph 24, and simply refer this Court to that section 
of their Opening Brief. 
With that said, Mr. Gunter simply speculates about Mr. Parker's Idaho-sourced income 
when he uses the word "appears." Either Mr. Parker has Idaho-sourced income or he does not; 
this determination should be factually based and not the result of allocation resulting from 
community property law. And, should this Court determine that resolution of whether or not Mr. 
Parker had Idaho-sourced income because of his direct ownership in an Idaho-based entity, as 
opposed to resulting from application of community property law principles, is required, then this 
Court should remand the case to the District Court for finther factual development as requested 
by the Tax Commission before the District Court. 
Continuing with its discussion of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit, at Page 25, the Tax 
Commission argues that Mr. Gunter determined that Mr. Parker had a separate filing requirement 
31n making this argument, the Parkers do not concede that Commerce Clause and Due 
Process principles do not apply. Specifically, if the marital community does not exist as a 
separate entity, then unitary business taxation principles probably should not apply because there 
is not a separate entity comprised of separate contributing components. 
with the state of Idaho regardless of the issues in this case. Since Mr. Parker was not an Idaho 
domiciliary, the only basis for this statement is Mr. Parker's receipt of Idaho-sourced income 
which, as discussed above, must be factually based and not the result of arbitrary application of 
community law principles. 
Having previously worked with Mr. Gunter, Parkers' Counsel readily acknowledges Mr. 
- Gunter's expertise in discussing income tax issues. This does not, however, promote him to the 
position of being the arbiter of legal issues or finder of facts. In other words, it is for the District 
Court to analyze and determine whether or not Mr. Parker had a filing requirement because such 
determination constitutes a legal conclusion. 
At Page 26 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that the audit schedules show that 
Mr. Parker received Idaho-sourced income from certain entities (Western Land & Development, 
LLC, and KPGMJC) in the amount of $13,122 and $19,506 which would have created an Idaho 
non-resident filing requirement. The Tax Commission then argues that the Parkers did not protest 
this determination before the Commission4. 
With all due respect, the Parkers did challenge this. In Paragraph V of their Petition for 
Judicial Review the Parkers allege that "[i]n issuing its Amended Decision the Commission erred 
by including the income earned by Mr. Parker while domiciled in the state of Nevada." The 
Parkers did challenge such inclusion when, in his Affidavit, Mr. Parker testified that he did not 
receive any Idaho-sourced income. The District Court, while not specifically addressing these 
However, in the next paragraph, the Tax Commission apparently acknowledges the 
Parkers' objection when it argues that; "[dluring the appeal before the district court, the only 
rebuttal to the audit schedules offered by the Parkers was David Parker's simple conclusion that 
he did not have an Idaho filing requirement, a conclusion without supporting facts or detail." 
two entities, did state that: "[tlhcrc is evidence in the record sufficient to conclude that during the 
years at issue, Mr. Parker had an interest in income producing property located in Idaho." @. Vol. 
I, P. 43). Therefore, the Parkers did challenge this determination before the District Court and 
again on Appeal to this Court: The Parkers argue that the District Court failed to identify how it 
made this determination; i.e. whether this interest results from a factual basis or is simply the 
result of application of community property law. - 
Immediately following its statement regarding Mr. Parker's interest, the District Court 
concludes that: "Mr. Parker has sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Idaho to subject 
him to income tax in the state." 8. Vol. I, P. 43). Missing from this determination is the 
identification of the basis for Mr. Parker's minimum contacts: is it the result of application of 
community property principles; is it the result of him having an undefined one-half interest in the 
separate entity referred to as the "marital community;" or, is it the result of Mr. Parker actually 
receiving income from Idaho entities in which he actually has an ownership interest. The Parkers 
submit that, depending upon the basis for the District Court's conclusion, there is a difference 
between them. 
Taking the Parkers' objections in sequence, we begin with the Tax Commission's 
Amended Decision. In the Amended Decision, the Tax Commission wrote: "[tlhe representative 
for the petitioners contends that the income should be deemed to be the separate property of each 
of the spouses according to which one was named as the owner of the account or other 
instrument giving rise to the income." 8. Vol. I, P. 20). In response, the Tax Commission then 
determined: "[iln attributing certain interest income from financial institutions, the petitioners 
originally reported some of this as being attributable solely to Idaho. The attribution of this 
income was not changed by the auditor. The income as community property should be attributed 
equally to each spouse and to the domicile of each of the petitioners." @. Vol. I, P. 21). 
As the Parkers read this language the Tax Commission did not determine which entities 
were actually Idaho-sourced entities. However, assuming that it did determine that the "financial 
institutions" were Idaho-sourced, then the Tax Commission appears to have acted in an 
inconsistent manner. ~esidents, pursuant.to Hemdon v. West, supra, report all of their 
distributive share of partnership and/or Sub-chapter S income. Non-Residents report their share 
only if the payor entity is an Idaho entity. Rather than applying these principles, the Tax 
Commission, relying on community property law, unspecified as to whether Idaho or Nevada, 
attributed one-half of the income to each spouse. This resulted in Mr. Parker's one-half being 
attributed to Nevada when it should have been attributed to the spouse who actually owned the 
interest in the paying entity. 
Next, contrary to Mr. Gunter's Affidavit, as the Parkers read the Amended Decision it 
does not specifically identify which entities were Idaho entities. Furthermore, Mi. Gunter does 
not state why Western Land and KPGMJC are Idaho based entities and how he knows such. 
Without such determination, simply applying community law principles produces the same 
conceptual issue that the Parkers object to regarding the wages. 
If the District Court relied upon mere legal fictions, i.e. marital community existing 
separate and apart from the spouses and/or community property principles, to allocate one-half of 
the income to Mr. Parker, then the mere application of such, without more, does not establish Mr. 
Parker's "minimum contacts" with Idaho. If Mr. Parker actually did receive Idaho sourced 
income because the payors were Idaho entities, then, applying the District Court's analysis and 
the Tax Commission's argument, then Mr. Parker would have an independent filing requirement. 
Once this filing requirement existed, Mr. Parker would then be required to include one-half of 
Mrs. Parker's income, based upon community law principles, with one-half of his income. 
Therefore, as the Parkers understand the Tax Commission's conclusion, the end result would be 
that the combined income of both parties would be subject to Idaho income tax simply resulting 
from Mr. Parker's, even though a non-resident, filing requirement arising from his allocated 
receipt of Idaho sourced income. However, the Tax Commission's actual assessment of 
additional Idaho income tax was not based upon these arguments. 
To the contrary, Mr. Parker testified in his Affidavit that he did not receive any Idaho- 
sourced income. The District Court overruled the Tax Commission's Motion to Strike his 
Affidavit and the Tax Commission did not Appeal that ruling. Therefore, should this Court 
determine that this issue is necessary for resolving the issues in this case, then the case should be 
remanded to the District Court for further factual development. 
Next, the Parkers read Mr. Gunter's Affidavit as advocating a position contradictory to 
the Tax Commission's position articulated in the Amended Decision. The Amended Decision 
states that such income should be attributed equally to each spouse and to the domicile of each of 
the petitioners (emphasis added). This means that, as applied to Mr. Parker, this income is 
attributed to Nevada and, consequently, cannot serve as a jurisdictional basis requiring Mr. 
Parker to file an Idaho non-resident income tax return. 
And, this method shows illustrates inconsistency by the Tax Commission in addressing 
community property law. When the Tax Commission identified financial institution income as 
community property, conceptually no different from the Parkers' wages, a consistent application 
of the Tax Commission's method would have resulted in one-half of each spouse's wages being 
attributed to the domicile of each spouse. This would have resulted in one-half of Mrs. Parker's 
wages being attributed to Nevada. This the Commission did not do. 
At Page 26 of its Brief, the Tax Commission argues that attorney fees should be assessed 
against the Parkers for presenting a frivolous and groundless argument. The Parkers disagree, 
This case represents a case of first impression for Idaho which the Parkers have pursue in good 
faith. And finally, the Herndon case does not address the issues presented in this case. 
111) CONCLUSION 
This case results from combination of statutory law imposing Idaho income tax on all 
sources received by Idaho residents with principles of community property law. Unlike other 
states or at the federal level, neither Idaho statutory nor common law address resolution of the 
inherent conflicts arising from arbitrary application of these two bodies of law. The Tax 
Commission's Amended Decision, as affirmed by the District Court for different reasons, 
impermissibly combines certain aspects of both bodies of law to achieve the most favorable tax 
results for the state of Idaho. 
Focusing on the specific Order being appealed from, the District Court made several 
conclusions to which the Parkers object. These have been discussed both in their Opening Brief 
and in this Reply Brief. The Parkers submit that the Constitutional problems involved in this case 
arise from the Tax Commission's impermissible combination and interpretation of statutory 
language and judicial opinion in order to achieve the economic result most favorable to the state 
of Idaho. 
When this Court considers and discusses the possible solutions presented by the Parkers, 
they submit that the following supports their argument that this Court should adopt one of the 
proposed solutions bearing in mind that Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,260, 954 P.2d 
676 (1998). "An appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its 
constitutionality. Page 4 of Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State, 2009-ID-0408.090 (Supreme Court, 7 
April 2009). When a statute and rule "can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no conflict 
between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way that results in a 
conflict." Page 4 of State v. Johnson, 2008-ID-R0627.001 (26 June 2008). 
Recognizing these principles, the Parkers respectfully submit that the District Court erred 
in the following manner and, when appropriate, recommends certain corrective action: (1) the 
District Court should have excluded 124 of Mr. Gunter's Affidavit in conducting its analysis and 
rendering its Decision; (2) the District Court erred in characterizing $601 5 as an "exemption" 
and, as such, its relief could not be incorporated into Idaho income tax law. Relying on its prior 
precedent, this Court should hold that the equitable relief provided by $6015 is incorporated by 
means of LC. $63-3002, and, should this Court determine that "marital community" exists as a 
separate entity, that it provides such equitable relief to the Parkers and other taxpayers similarly 
situated. (3) Alternatively, this Court can hold that the Tax Commission's method of subjecting 
Mr. Parker's Nevada wages to Idaho income tax violates Due Process and/or Commerce Clause 
protections. As proper relief, the Court should then hold that the proper method of addressing the 
Parkers' situation is this: apply community law principles and apportion one-half of Mrs. 
Parker's income to Nevada and one-half of Mr. Parker's Nevada income to Idaho; or, 
alternatively, subject 100% of Mrs. Parker's Idaho wages to income tax based on residency and 
exclude all of Mr. Parker's Nevada wages due to lack of nexus. (4) Alternatively, this Court 
could adopt the analysis reflected in the Keller holding, and remand the matter for a factual 
determination as to whether or not Mr. Parker had separated from Mrs. Parker as contemplated 
by Nevada community property law. 
Respytfully submitted this 29th day of April 2009. 
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